Personnel Economics Workshop (PEW)

Notice

• PEW in 2026 will be held on the fourth Saturday of each month. The workshop starts at 3:00 p.m.

• Each workshop basically consists of two sessions: a 1-hour presentation and a 1.5-hour presentation.

Next Workshop

May 30 (Sat.) 2026

• Venue: Waseda University; classroom 709 Building 3

1st Session

• Speaker: Shingo Takahashi (Kobe University)

• Title: Compensating wage differentials as a cover for discrimination

• Abstract:

• This paper develops a simple model of taste-based discrimination to suggest that a firm uses a compensating wage differential as a cover for discrimination. In the model, men and women work slightly different tasks, so there is a legitimate reason to pay a compensating wage differential. However, the value of the task difference is hard to establish, making it difficult for the workers to prove discrimination. The firm strategically takes advantage of this difficulty to misrepresent discrimination as a compensating wage differential by shifting the gender wage gap to the compensating wage differential component of the wage. This strategic action makes it difficult for workers to win the discrimination lawsuit if they sue, and deters workers from suing in the first place, thus doubly protecting the firm from discrimination liability, and making the remedial function of equal pay legislations ineffectual. Empirically, this strategic action makes the detection of discrimination harder as the resulting wage structure resembles that of a compensating wage differential. Controlling for hours worked would underestimate the extent of discrimination as the gender difference in hours worked is a direct consequence of discrimination. We review some prominent discrimination cases to show how firms use compensating wage differentials as a cover for discrimination in practice.

• Language: English

• Time: 14:30-16:00

2nd Session

• Speaker: Katsuya Takii (University of Osaka)

• Title:  The Effect of Initial Job in Japanese Labor Market

• Abstract: We investigate the effect of being a regular employee in a job which a worker takes immediately after graduation (the initial job), on subsequent job status. We construct an assignment model that can be estimated by the marginal treatment effect (MTE) framework; the model suggests that the region- and cohort-level unexpected shocks that influences the demand for full time-worker share is a valid instrument under some assumptions. Estimating the MTE, we find that the treatment effect of the initial job is heterogeneous among individuals: male workers who are less likely to obtain regular employment in the initial job enjoy benefits of stable employment; however, the regular initial job does not increase the probability of subsequent regular employment for male workers who are likely to obtain regular employment in the initial job. We provide a plausible interpretation to explain these facts. 

• Language: English/Japanese

• Time: 16:15-17:45

How to attend?

Sign up to our mailing list to receive information about our workshop by sending an email to: eoe-office[@]list.waseda.jp (Replace [@] with @.)

In-person venues or/and Zoom meeting URL will be announced via the mailing list.

Upcoming Workshops

June 27 (Sat.) 2026

• Venue: Waseda University; classroom 709 Building 3

July 25 (Sat.) 2026

• Venue: Waseda University; classroom 709 Building 3

• Speaker: Hitoshi Mitsuhashi (Waseda University)

• Title:  Move-the-Goalpost as a Response to Negative Performance Outcomes and Low Inferred Controllability

• Abstract:

• While prior research in organizational learning and performance feedback theory emphasizes adaptive and corrective search following performance shortfalls, emerging work suggests that organizations may instead disengage from learning. This study examines when organizations respond to negative performance outcomes by “moving the goalposts” (MTG)—lowering performance standards rather than engaging in corrective search. Drawing on attribution perspectives, we theorize that MTG is more likely when managers infer limited controllability over performance outcomes. Such inferences arise when external causes dominate internal ones, when internal and external causes are interdependent, and when performance exhibits high variability over time. We test these arguments using data from U.S. domestic airlines and exploit a regulatory change requiring airlines to report delay attributions. We operationalize MTG as schedule padding, or extending scheduled flight durations to buffer against delays. Using a 24-month panel, we find that schedule padding is more likely under conditions of low inferred controllability and high operational complexity. Our findings also suggest that performance improvements sometimes occur on routes where firms extend scheduled durations. This study challenges the dominant view that organizations primarily respond to poor performance through adaptive search, highlighting conditions under which managers instead redefine performance standards.

• Language: English

• Time: 16:15-17:45

Jan 23 (Sat.) 2026

• Venue: Waseda University; classroom TBA

• Speaker: Tsuyoshi Tsuru (Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University)

• Title:  研究者・科学者の生産性

• Abstract:

• TBA

• Language: 日本語

• Time: 16:15-17:45